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Abstract
Income differences across country, banking crises and oil price shocks are the dominant
macroeconomic features of our age and main economic difficulties faced by economies. This paper
attempts to discuss these three topics one by one.
In the first Chapter, using a PPP-adjusted series of GDP per capita for the entire Caribbean
over 1960-2013 period, we examine why some countries in this area are so rich and some others are
not. We employ a Bayesian Model Averaging Framework and surprisingly find that the identity of
last colonizer and the length of history after achieving independence matter most in determining
the income differentials there. Caribbean islands that are finally colonized by UK or have longer
timing of independence receive much lower levels of per capita GDP. Our results also show that the
timing of colonial experience does not seem to matter too much in terms of income differentials in
the Caribbean, which is opposite to the findings of some existing literature.
In the second chapter, we examine the output costs and deposits costs associated with 116
banking crises using cross country data for years after 1970 and develop an severity index of crises
based on the deposits loss. Many banking crises do not lead to contractions in output and deposits,
a result that holds for cases with/without deposit insurance schemes. We find that 1) middle and
low income economies seem have received the most severe banking crises since 1970s; 2) the banking
crises are not getting worse across time; 3) crises with deposit insurance schemes are slightly less
severe than that without deposit insurance.
In the third chapter, we examine the relationship between output growth and oil prices
change using one linear and two major non-linear specifications. We include eight OECD countries
in our dataset and two of them, the UK and Norway, are oil exporters. Under linear specification, a
positive standard deviation innovation in oil prices has a strong positive effect on real GDP growth for
almost all oil importing countries, a finding that is against theoretical intuition. However, the results
ii
obtained from the two non-linear approaches tell the opposite stories and confirm the inaccuracy of
linear specification.
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Chapter 1
Caribbean Islands: Seemingly So
Homogeneous but Quite Different
Levels of Wealth. Why?
1.1 Introduction
In some countries, a person can routinely log into a Wi-Fi to connect with other people all
over the world, sheltered from the elements in a heated and air-conditioned home. In some other
countries, people have no access to clean water and electricity, let alone Internet. Why are some
people rich while others are not? A considerable number of studies have explored this topic and
attributed institutions, technology innovation, and geography, etc. to the driving factors of wealth.
However, countries in relatively concentrated regions such as the Caribbean have similar geographic
features, historical background, cultural heritage and demographic characteristics, why do their
income levels still present such a large difference? In this paper, we try to find the answers. An
inquiry into the subject also may prove informative about theories that explain income differentials
across countries and possibly shape domestic and regional policies.
The Caribbean Sea includes many island nations and territories. Figure 1.1 shows a map
of this sea and its physical features. Figure 1.2 shows its political divisions. This study explores
states located in the Caribbean Sea that are not parts of continents or outlying islands of nearby
1
countries, such as the islands of the coast of Belize. Thus, we include 24 states in the Caribbean
Sea as listed in Table 1.1. We use the terms “states” for these political entities, for many of which
are not fully independent countries1
In Figure 1.3 and 1.4, we compare the GDP per capita (PPP) of Caribbean states and their
log values from 1960 to 2013. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to provide
a PPP-adjusted series of GDP per capita for the entire Caribbean over such a long period. The study
conducted by Bulmer Thomas (2012) does not achieve this. The latest Penn World Tables (9.0)
does not include Cuba, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the French islands of Martinique, and Guadeloupe.
Additionally, the Penn World Tables series for most states are quite short. Thus, consolidating these
series offer a clear picture of the levels and growth rates of economic performance of the region. And
we find some features of these data are very interesting and impressive.
First, large portions of the Caribbean area were quite wealthy early on.
Table 1.2 show the GDP per capita and life expectancy of the richest islands in 1960. We
also present countries with roughly equivalent income levels using data from the Penn World Tables.
It is surprising to find that large portions of the Caribbean area were quite wealthy early on. These
richest islands in the Caribbean, like the Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
etc. shared nearly similar income levels with Western Europe.
Second, income levels across Caribbean states differ dramatically.
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for 24 Caribbean states
from 1960 to 2013 using a “violin” graph where for every five year we provide the density and the
quartiles. This graph reveals substantial dispersion in income levels and obviously it is getting more
severe after 1980s. Aruba, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Trinidad and Tobago, the British and U.S.
Virgin Islands are among the top states in the Caribbean in terms of income levels. By contrast,
Haiti, Jamaica, Cuba, Grenada and Dominica, and other states have low income levels (Figure 1.4).
In 2013, the GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) of the Caribbean ranges from $35,893 in Aruba
to $1,719 in Haiti (Figure 1.5). Income differences in the Caribbean differ by a factor of 20.9. 2
This figure does not cover the full range of incomes in the world, but it is closer to the full range
than one might expect. Of the 182 countries included in the Penn World Tables (9.0), Aruba ranks
1Some countries are in the usual sense of the term, some are provinces of France and some are offshore territories
of other countries.
2in 1960, the multiple between the highest GDP per capita country (the Bahamas) and the lowest GDP per capita
country (Turks and Caicos) is 22.
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31st in 2013, and Haiti ranks close to the bottom at 165. Aruba is not the only country close to
the top of the rankings. Trinidad and Tobago and the British Virgin Islands rank 38th and 40th,
respectively. Haiti, however, stands out as one of the poorest countries in the world and the poorest
country in the Western Hemisphere.
The GDP estimates of Caribbean states are less informative than those across some other
countries. In particular, Aruba, has substantial industries providing offshore financial services. The
GDP of this country overstates the real income of residents. Moreover, the factor of magnitude will
be enlarged if Haiti is included, given the extremely low level of income in this country.
Thus, we exclude Aruba and Haiti and re-calculate the factor. The range of income from
highest to lowest is still 4.8. This study compares the magnitude of income differences in the
Caribbean with that in Western Europe and South America. Similar to the Caribbean region,
countries in Western Europe are closely scattered with similar climates, cultural values, demographic
compositions and political systems.3 Figure 1.6 shows no obvious differences in the income levels of
Western European countries, except for Switzerland. Switzerland has the highest GDP per capita
(PPP) at $58,961 in 2013, whereas Greece, with the lowest GDP per capita, has approximately
$22,043 in the same year. The range of income from highest to lowest is only 2.7, which is only
half of range in the Caribbean even without Haiti and Aruba. Similarly, this factor in the South
America is 3.7, which is also lower than that in the Caribbean area (Figure 1.7).
More generally, the large differences in income levels across the Caribbean are persistent
and do not decrease much over time. Figure 1.8 shows the standard deviation of log GDP per capita
(PPP) by year. The left panel refers to all Caribbean states in the list. Clearly, there is no sigma
income convergence for the entire Caribbean. The right panel refers to all Caribbean states except
for Haiti. After we exclude Haiti, the area does see some convergence.
Other measures of residents’ well-being do however show signs of larger convergence. Health
and education variables improved and differences decreased dramatically over time. Figures 1.9 and
1.10 are the graphs for life expectancy and infant mortality rates from 1960 to 2013. By the end of
that period, both these two variables converged in all states, except for Haiti.
Third, the growth rates of income per capita in the Caribbean are not persistent.
The growth rates of GDP per capita (PPP) in the Caribbean were very high in the years
3We don‘t use all European Union countries here because certain countries were ever under the Communist Regime.
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shortly after 1960. The average growth rate is 2.4% over the period 1960-20134. We divide the period
from 1960 to 2013 into two equal-length sub-periods, 1960-1986 and 1987-2013, to compare growth
rates over time (see Figure 1.11). Countries with high growth rates in the first phase did not have
high growth rates in the second phase. A large proportion of Caribbean states became independent
by 1980s. The improvement of these states has been much slower after their independence, which is
perhaps, surprising.
The Caribbean was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1492. Northeast trade winds and
ocean currents took the ships of the Columbus expedition from Europe to the Caribbean Sea. The
Caribbean then became the springboard for European exploration and conquest of the Americas. All
states in the Caribbean experienced a long or short history of colonialism. Historians often criticize
the cruelness and brutality of the colonial rule and argue its long term negative impacts. This study,
however, uses a Bayesian Model Averaging Framework and shows that time spent after gaining
independence is strongly negatively correlated with income levels across the Caribbean states.
In recent years, a plethora of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of colonialism
on post-colonial development. One of representative literature by Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009)
suggests that “longer European colonial exposure is good for the modern inhabitants and later years
of colonialism are associated with higher modern income levels”[27]. In this paper, we testify that
Caribbean does not belong to the case. And according to our results, the identity of last ruler plays
an important role in the quality of colonization and modern-day GDP per capita. Our findings are
proven robust to different time period of income in the Caribbean.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature, and Section 3
describes the dataset, and Section 4 examines the factors that matter in determining the income
differentials through Bayesian Model Averaging Framework. Section 5 reports the results. Section
6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Massive qualitative and quantitative studies have explored the link between colonial-era
policies and institutions to contemporary variation in income levels. One of the most influential
4This level is quite high by the international standard. We compare this growth rate with those of the economies
listed in the Penn World Tables. The average growth rate of 182 countries in the Penn World Tables is 2.0 from 1960
to 2013.
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studies is that of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [AJR] (2001, 2002), who argue that depending
on the local pre-colonial population density, Europeans choose to establish different institutions in
the countries they colonized. In sparsely populated states, Europeans immigrate in large numbers
and set up institutions to protect their property rights and investment, thereby creating a positive
impact on the development of those colonies. On the contrary, in densely populated states, European
were likely to set up extractive institutions that aim to transfer as many resources of the colony
as possible to the colonizer. Accordingly, this strategy left a negative impact on the long-term
development of colonies.
This statement has been not without challenges. According to Engerman and Sokoloff
(2002), the roots of these income disparities lay in differences in the initial factor endowments, such
as soil and climate, within each colonized country, rather than its Native Americans’ population
density. Perhaps surprising at first glance, many authors had documented the positive impact of
colonialism on the current income performance. Glaeser et al. (2004) present evidence that the
colonizers brought considerable development to the colonies. For example, colonizers had engaged
in building schools, roads and infrastructure.
Furthermore, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) use a database of islands throughout the Atlantic,
Pacific and Indian Oceans to quantify the effect of colonial experience on modern economic outcomes.
According to their findings, 1) “the number of years spent as a European colony is strongly positively
related to the island’s GDP per capita and negatively related to infant mortality”[27]; 2) “the timing
of the colonial experience seems to matter. Later years of colonialism are associated with the a much
larger increase in modern GDP than years before 1800”[27]. In this paper, we also try to examine
whether their findings fit the case of Caribbean in the following sections.
Another influential strand asserts that growth is partially determined by the legal system
influenced by the colonizer. In particular, many scholars argue that the British common law was
more conductive to growth than the French, Spanish and Portuguese legal systems. Legal origin
is hypothesized to affect development through the following four mechanisms: 1) The adaptability
of British legal institutions to a market economy provides higher levels of personal freedom (Hayek
1960; Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998; North 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2003, 2005).
2) Common law systems provide a more rigorous enforcement of contracts and stronger security of
property rights than the French civil law systems, which protect individual rights from the state
(Poe and Tate 1994; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999; Hall and Jones 1999; Levine, Loayza, and
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Beck 2000; Morriss and Meiners 2000; Treisman 2000; Mahoney 2001; Joireman 2001; Bertocchi and
Canova 2002; Banerjee and Iyer 2005). 3) “British colonies are more likely to become democracies
than other colonies” (Smith 1978; Huntington 1984; Weiner 1989; Lipset 1994, Coliver 2000). 4)
“Output per worker today is correlated with language, with English had a particularly strong positive
effect” (Hall and Jones 1999)[29].
However, suggestions of a positive effect of British colonial institutions have not received
universal empirical support. Prezworski et al. (2000), AJR (2001) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson
and Yared (2007) find that dummy variables for colonial origin is not significant in terms of its impact
on contemporaneous income level. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), the identity of the
colonizer doesn’t determine the institutions chosen by the colonizer and the labor force drawn to
different regions. This formulation is congruent with Lee and Schultz (2011) who claimed that “any
estimation of “colonizer effects” may be biased by endogeneity of the choice of colonies in the first
place”[41].
A plethora of studies have attempted to investigate the impact of post-independence on
modern development. However, there are no clear-cut answers. Historians often criticize the cruel-
ness and brutality of the colonial rule and argue its long term negative impacts on local economy
(Mahmood[1996]). On the contrary, many other authors believe there are significant benefits to be
associated with a developed country. Briguglio (1995) claims “many small island developing states
may not have survived as independent states in the absence of artificial props?”. Armstrong and
Read (2000) use a database of 140 micro-states and find that dependent territories exhibit superior
GNP per capita values to sovereign micro-states. That is, “there appear to be benefits to being a
dependency that more than compensate for other inherent disadvantages experienced by the tiny,
fragmented nature of most of the remaining dependent territories”[6].
1.3 Data
Data on island colonization, GDP and other geographic variables are assembled from a large
number of sources. Table 1.2 presents our list of Caribbean islands/states and their population size,
land area, first and last colonizer, current political arrangement, year of the first colonial settlement
and first internal self-governance.
The United Kingdom (UK) was the dominant colonial power in the Caribbean in the nine-
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teenth and twentieth centuries, at least in terms of the number of subsequent states. Fifteen states
or 63% of states in the list were colonies of the UK. However, this fact understates the influence of
other colonial powers. Colonies changed hands repeatedly either in a friendly or unfriendly manner.
For example, St. Vincent passed back and forth between the Britain and France. Puerto Rico was
colonized by both Spain and the U.S.. The U.S. Virgin Islands was controlled by Denmark but was
later purchased by the U.S. in 1917 for military reasons related to World War I. The former colonies
of Spain included two of the largest states, namely, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, and many
other states in the earlier years.
We characterize the political arrangements between one political entity and others as 1)
Dependent on another country for internal administration and external relations (“as a colony”);
2) Home rule with independence in internal administration and dependent on another country for
external relations (“states with internal self-governance”); and 3) Independent. One country may
be in all three states at different times. To date, the progression in the Caribbean has been from
condition one to two or three. Some states are in fact departments of France, responsible for internal
administration but limited by the national government. We classify them in the second condition.
Some of the states, such as the British Virgin Islands, have populations in tens of thousands and
cannot credibly maintain a military defense. These are classified in the second condition, as are
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. None of the states now is still in the first condition. Of
the 24 states, 14 attained independence after World War II.
In order to quantify the different effect of various political arrangement on the modern
income, we divide the whole period into three sub-periods according to the following procedures:
Number of Years as a Colony =
Year when Internal Self-Governance Started−Year of First Colonial Settlement + 1
(1.1)
Number of Years with Internal Self-Governance =
Year of Independence−Year when Internal Self-Governance Started + 1, if Independent
2013-Year when Internal Self-Governance Started + 1, if Dependent
(1.2)
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Number of Years as an Independent Country =

2013−Year of Independence + 1, if Independent
0, if Dependent
(1.3)
The colonial and settlement variables for each island come from myriad sources. We use
mainly the book “The Economic History of the Caribbean Since the Napoleonic Wars” by Victor
Bulmer-Thomas and supplemented this source with information from the Encyclopedia Britannica
and official websites maintained by the governments of each island. We collect the entire history of
each island, including the first European settlements, the extent of such settlements and the political
history of the island’s colonization if any. As shown in the Figure 1.12, approximately 33% of the
states in the list have been colonized for over 330 years and only 25% of the states had internal
self-governance for over 50 years.
We believe our way to calculate the length of colonization, self-governance and independence
is very reasonable. The earlier literature, such as Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), mixed internal self-
governance with the colonization period, which may lead to a wrong estimation of the timing of
colonization.
Ideally, our GDP per capita would allow us to compare both levels and growth rates across
all Caribbean islands since 1960. Arriving at such estimates involves at least three difficulties. First,
we rely on the Penn World Tables (9.0) for the PPP adjusted estimates. However, the Penn World
Tables does not include Guadeloupe, Martinique, the British and US Virgin Islands, Cuba and
Puerto Rico, we have to supply PPP data from other sources. With the exception of possibly Cuba,
our estimates are likely reasonable. The second difficulty lies in obtaining data for Cuba. The GDP
data for Cuba in many sources are not very reasonable and are of dubious value. Fortunately, Ward
and Devereux (2010) carefully estimated the GDP data for Cuba. The last difficulty lies with the
smaller islands. The Penn World Tables starts for most of these islands at 1970 or even later. Here
we use the series from Bulmer Thomas’s detailed research. This series is the first effort to provide
a PPP adjusted series of GDP per capital for the entire Caribbean over such a long period5.
Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics for PPP adjusted income and the variables that we
5Of course, the dataset is not completely perfect. The PPP adjustment likely works quite well for the later periods.
However, as we move further away from the comparison year, the comparisons become less accurate because countries
construct GDP with different weights and also because relative prices change. This is a problem with all international
comparisons and not just for the Caribbean.
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consider as possible determinants. For the income data, it is not difficult to find the growth rates of
income start to slowdown after they achieved independence.
Many discussions assume that colonialism in history plays a important role in modern-day
outcomes. Thus, we examine whether the length of colonization, the timing with internal self-
governance, the length of independence and the identity of colonizers help predict the behavior of
modern GDP per capita. In addition, in order to test whether the quality of colonization is consistent
from the beginning to the end, we divide the length of colonization into two sub-periods: number of
centuries6 as a colony before 1800 and after 18007.
Hurricane strikes vary substantially across the Caribbean. The Caribbean is located in a
hurricane’s belt with a relatively large number of hurricanes occurring in the area. Given the trade
winds from Europe to the Caribbean and their historical importance for transportation costs, the
trade routes from Europe to the Caribbean in the era of colonization may be important. Accordingly,
we incorporate the frequency and severity of hurricanes in this study. For data on hurricanes in the
Caribbean area, we refer to the North Atlantic Hurricane Database (HURDAT). We enumerate all
hurricane incidences in each country from 1851 to 2013.
Other geographic factors may also play a role. We include the land area, precipitation and
the location dummy variable. Approximately 54 percent of the islands are located in the Leeward
and Windward Islands, facing the prevailing trade winds.
1.4 Bayesian Model Averaging
Model uncertainty and variable selections are two main difficulties faced by economists and
statisticians. If we have a lot of independent variables at hand and not too much is known about
their relative importance, how can we decide which of them should be included to illustrate the
question of interest?
More specifically, let X denote the n × p matrix of all the independent variables used to
predict the outcome Y. And then we could configure a model space [M1,M2, . . .MQ] where Q = 2
p.
Which one is the “correct” model?
One approach in this examination would be stepwise regression in which the statistically
6We do “number of centuries” instead of “number years” in the estimation in order to achieve a bigger coefficient
in the model.
7Most states became colonized since 1600s. We pick 1800 as the breakpoint so that the length of colonization can
be divided from the middle.
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insignificant variables are eliminated step by step until all of the leftover have a p-value less than
0.05. The problems with this approach are well known. An alternative way is to subjectively choose
several key independent variables and then estimate that regression against them as if the selected
model has produced the data. This practice is also questionable.
In this analysis, we introduce an approach called Bayesian Model Averaging to address the
issues of model uncertainty and variable selection. This methodology has been increasingly popular
in recent years for its ability to objectively decide which variables out of a large pool are the driving
factors and allow researchers to calculate the posterior distributions of the coefficients.
In a least square regression, the posterior distribution of a coefficient θ is
p(θ|x) = p(x|θ)p(θ)
p(x)
where p(x) is the marginal distribution of the data, p(x|θ) is the likelihood function and p(θ) is the
prior probability distribution of θ.
Now we expand our scope to the model space [M1,M2, . . .MQ] and then the expected value
of θ is
Eθ =
Q∑
i=1
θp(θ|x,Mi)p(Mi|x)
Unlike a simple regression parameter, the result here represents the posterior probability
of a particular model p(Mi|x). The general result is not to gauge which model out of the model
space is more or less better. The result is a posterior distribution of each variable. By comparing
the posterior inclusion probability to the prior probability, we are able to draw the conclusion that
whether this variable is important or not.
The next challenge is to specify an appropriate prior. A plenty of earlier literature have
assumed a uniform distribution over models. Under this assumption, each model in the model space
is equally important and thus has the same prior probability. I find this assumption does not fit very
well in most cases. For example, if we have 30 potential independent variables under concern, the
size of our model space then should be 230 = 1, 073, 741, 824 and accordingly the prior probability
for each model will approach zero. It is meaningless to set the prior probability to be zero. Thus,
it makes more sense to assign equal prior probability to each variable instead of to each model.
By doing so, we are able to set an appropriate mean length of regressions –five. That is, we are
more inclined to have five most important variables on the right-hand side. This implies a prior
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probability for each variable of 17 percent (= 5/30).
Of course this is not the only way to assign prior probabilities, but we do so. Our empirical
work uses only geographic and colonial variables. Before we run the regression, it is hard to expect
which variable will have a higher prior probability. Thus, we tend to assume that all explanatory
variables are equally likely ex ante.
With prior choices of probabilities made, we need only worry about the prior distribution
for parameters. We specify a normal distribution with a mean of zero to represent the limited
information available about the parameters. It remains to choose the prior for the large variance-
covariance matrix. In this study, we use a g-prior or a Zellner g-prior.
Since we only have 24 observations, we are able to calculate the likelihood function by
enumerating all models for 24 covariates. Otherwise, we would recommend a sampler called Markov
Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (MCMC).
1.5 Main Results
Table 1.4 presents statistics that derived from the posterior distributions of coefficients for
variables that determine large income differences in 2013 in Caribbean states. The table groups
variables similar to Table 1.38. The second column presents the posterior mean of the coefficient.
The mean is a product of probability of the variable included by the mean coefficient conditional on
the inclusion of this variable. The third column is the posterior standard deviation of the coefficient.
The fourth column is the posterior inclusion probability. The final column is the conditional positive
sign, which represents the fraction of positive coefficients obtained from all the models visited by
the enumeration scheme.
Clearly, no geographic variables other than the size of arable land appear to be important
in determining the income differences in the sense that almost none of their posterior probability of
inclusion is overwhelming in Table 1.4 and only the size of arable land is above the prior probability
of 26 percent.
However, relative to the earlier literature, the table is interestingly surprising. Number
of Centuries as an Independent Country has the most prevailing posterior inclusion probability of
0.9722, which implies that 97.22% of posterior model mass rests on models that include this variable.
8We don’t include variables like education, capital amount, electricity usage, life expectancy, infant mortality, and
fertility,etc in the model to avoid the problem of reversing causality.
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Countries with a change in the length of history being independent one standard deviation higher
can be expected to have a much lower modern-day income. In interpreting this result, it is important
to note the data are cross section. The mean coefficient is the expected response to longer history of
independence relative to other states, not the length of history being independent within a particular
country over time.
The next question is of course, why is independence in these states bad for income levels?
Historians often argue that colonial status limits the development of domestic capabilities. Becoming
independent - to have complete control over taxation, regulation and global promotion - will give
colonized states the tools to create greater opportunities for growth and a more beneficial business
climate. Our results, nevertheless, told an opposite story that a greater degree of autonomy for the
Caribbean states had led to lower income levels.
Early in the 1960s, when most Caribbean states were either dependent or newly independent,
Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados were among the richest states in the Caribbean. Fifty years later,
those states had fallen in ranks from the listing, while Aruba, Martinique and other dependent
territories are classified as having high incomes by World Development Report (WDR). This fact
alone points to the importance of western influences in the sense that those dependent territories
have lower political and economic risks with the support of the adopted countries.
After Jamaica and Barbados each gained their independence, many British states followed
their steps to become independent. From then on, a large mass of whites had been exodusing from
these states to North America or Europe. And most of them are skilled and educated labor. The
significant level of skilled emigration from the Caribbean is generally indicative that brain drain had
been occurring (Lowell and Findlay 2002) and human capital had been losing. This maybe another
reason why obtaining independence did not bring them greater development.
Results also suggest that the identity of last ruler plays a more important role in the quality
of colonization and modern-day GDP per capita than the first colonizers. The variables of “Final
Colonist UK” and “Final Colonist Spain” have inclusion probabilities of 44 and 30 percent, respec-
tively, but in opposite sign. These findings show that the UK was significantly worse than the other
final colonizers but Spaniards were much better in this sense. Countries that were finally colonized
by UK are expected to have a much lower level of per capita GDP in 2013.
Of course, the results above may be questionable since we include Haiti and Cuba in the
regression. Haiti was the first country in the Caribbean sea to achieve independence from European
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rulers in 1804 and after Haiti, Cuba achieved independence in 1902. They have the longest history
of independence but the lowest income per capita in the sample. The inclusion of these two states
may give rise to misleading results given Haiti’s extremely low income levels and Cuba’s Communist
regime problem.
In Table 1.5, as a result, we left out Haiti and Cuba from the original the computation. The
variable of “Final Colonist UK” stands out with the highest posterior inclusion probability of 59.92
percent, which should receive the same implications above and demonstrate a bad final influence
installed by the Britain colonizers.
Not surprisingly, the posterior inclusion probability of Number of Centuries as an Indepen-
dent Country has sharply fallen to 29.96 percent, but still over the prior probability of 26 percent
(= 5/19). It continued to be negatively correlated with the income levels in 2013, implying that
once those Caribbean states (even if without Haiti and Cuba) left their ”mother country”, their
economic performances were less aggressive than the time they still had direct connection with the
European colonizers.
It should be noticed that the association obtained from the empirical study should not be
read as an argument against decolonization. Except for the economic consideration, a lot of issues
regarding political, moral and others will be involved since decolonization is such a very complex
problem.
As discussed in the literature review above, we are hoping to test whether the findings
Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) are consistent with the case of Caribbean Sea. In Table 1.4 and 1.5,
although Number of Centuries as a colony have positive signs in both tables, neither of their posterior
inclusion probabilities is prevailing, which implies that in the Caribbean, the length of colonization
does not matter too much in terms of income levels.
We then break Number of Centuries as a colony into two sub-periods: before 1800 and
after 1800 and re-compute the regression. New results are listed in Table 1.6 9. The variables of
Number of Centuries as a colony after 1800 and Number of Centuries as a colony before 1800 have
the posterior inclusion probabilities of 17.52 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively, that is, neither of
them is over the prior probability of 25% (= 5/20). Although they have opposite signs and years of
later colonialism seem to behave better in terms of income levels, the timing of colonial experience
does not seem to matter too much in the case of Caribbean. In other words, Feyrer and Sacerdote
9Haiti and Cuba are excluded
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(2006)’s findings do not fit for the colonies in the Caribbean.
In the previous computations, we use income per capita in 2013 as the benchmark. We are
wondering whether our results are robust to using different year of income. Thus, in Table 1.7 and
1.8, we use GDP per capita (PPP) in Initial Year as the new dependent variable. “Initial year” here
refers to the first year of income available in our data. Due to the availability of data, the initial
year varies across country. For the most states in the Caribbean, the initial year refers to 1960. For
Anguilla and Aruba, the initial year refers to 1970, while for Turks and Caicos Islands, it refers to
1980. Meanwhile, we adjust the explanatory variables according to the same timing framework10.
The results in Table 1.7 and 1.8 are basically consistent with the analysis above. The
identity of ruler seems to matter most in determining the income differences. “Final Colonist UK”
and “First Colonist France” have the highest posterior inclusion probabilities of 46.53 percent and
36.04 percent, respectively and they are both negatively associated with the initial year income
levels. In the previous literature, we are left with an impression that British and French colonial
origins were more conductive to growth than that of Spaniards and Portuguese. Apparently, in the
Caribbean, this had not been the case.
1.6 Conclusions
This study, for the first time, provides a PPP-adjusted series of GDP per capita for the
entire Caribbean from 1960 to 2013. This series offers a clear picture of the level and growth rates
of economic performance of the region. Accordingly, some very interesting and unanswered puzzles
are observed from the data: first, many of the islands demonstrated a high income level per capita
by 1960; second, income levels across countries in Caribbean differ dramatically; third, the growth
rates of income per capita in the Caribbean are not persistent. In this paper, we attempt to explore
these puzzles by examining what variables help to determine the dramatic output differences across
the Caribbean countries.
We employ a Bayesian Model Averaging framework to avoid the difficulties of model uncer-
tainty and variable selections. The most interesting fact is a robust negative relationship between
the length of history after achieving independence and current levels of income. Our interpretations
are the following: 1) dependent territories may have lower political and economic risks that inde-
10In order to have a more accurate result, we exclude Haiti and Cuba from the computation again.
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pendent states cannot enjoy, with the support of the adopted countries; 2) the remarkable exodus
of white population from the independent states had led to a great loss of skilled human capital and
technology in the area.
It should be noticed that the association obtained from the empirical study should not be
read as an argument against decolonization. Except for the economic consideration, a lot of issues
regarding political, moral and others will be involved since decolonization is such a very complex
problem.
In addition, we find the identity of last ruler plays an important role in the quality of
colonization and modern-day GDP per capita. Caribbean islands that are finally colonized by UK
have a much lower level of per capita GDP in 2013. We also testify that the timing of colonial
experience does not seem to matter too much in terms of income differentials in the Caribbean,
which is opposite to the findings of Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009). All our results are robust to initial
year of income.
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1.7 Data Appendix
Our data set contains GDP, population, geographic variables and colonial settlement for
each Caribbean state as well as welfare measures. This appendix provides a brief description of
sources and procedures.
1. PPP-adjusted GDP
(1) 1960-1969: Unless otherwise note, GDP are from Victory-Bulmer Thomas.
(2) 1970-2013: Real GDP at constant 2005 national prices (in mil. 2005 US dollars) are
mainly from Penn World Tables 9.0. But Penn World Tables does not include the following states.
Guadeloupe and Martinique: National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
The British Virgin Islands: Victory-Bulmer Thomas
The U.S. Virgin Islands: The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides estimates.
Cuba and Puerto Rico: Ward, M. and Devereux, J.
Netherland Antilles: United Nations Database
2. Population and Slave Population
The book of Victory-Bulmer Thomas and Penn World Tables 9.0.
3. Hurricane Strikes and Wind Speed
For data on hurricanes in the Caribbean area, we refer to the North Atlantic Hurricane
Database (HURDAT). We enumerate all hurricane incidences in each country from 1851 to 2013.
4. Rainfall
Climate Change Knowledge Portal for Development Practitioners and Policy Makers, the
World Bank Group
5. Arable Land
CIA World Factbook, Worldstat Info and World Data Atlas: Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization.
6. Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality Rate
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World Bank Indicators; CIA World Factbook; PBR World Population Data Sheet; United
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population
Prospects: The 2015 Revision, DVD Edition; United States Census Bureau International Database;
Trading Economics.
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Figure 1.1: Caribbean Sea: Depth Contours and Submarine Features
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2005. Copyrighted by them.
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Figure 1.2: Caribbean Sea, Countries and Islands
Source: WorldAtlas.com, copyrighted by the Woolwine-Moen Group
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Figure 1.3: Violin Graph: GDP per capita PPP adjusted from 1960 to 2013 in the Caribbean (every
five years)
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Figure 1.4: Caribbean Countries: Log GDP per capita PPP adjusted from 1960 to 2013 (US dollars)
Country ISO Code: TTO is for Trinidad and Tobago; VCT is for St. Vincent and the Grenadines;VGB is for The
British Virgin Islands; VIG is for The US Virgin Islands; LCA is for St. Lucia; MSR is for Montserrat; MTQ is for
Martinique; PRI is for Puerto Rico; TCA is for Turks and Caicos Islands; GLP is for Guadeloupe; GRD is for
Grenada; HTI is for Haiti; JAM is for Jamaica; KNA is for St. Kitts and Nevis; BRB is for Barbados; CUB is for
Cuba; CYM is for The Cayman Islands; DMA is for Dominica; DOM is for Dominican Republic; ABW is for Aruba;
AIA is for Anguilla; ANT is for Netherlands Antilles; ATG is for Antigua and Barbuda; BHS is for Bahamas.
Source: See data Appendix
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Figure 1.5: Caribbean Countries: GDP per capita in 2013 (PPP adjusted) (US dollars)
Source: Penn World Tables (9.0)
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Figure 1.6: Western European Countries: GDP per capita in 2013 (PPP adjusted) (US dollars)
Source: Penn World Tables (9.0)
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Figure 1.7: Latin American Countries: GDP per capita in 2013 (PPP adjusted) (US dollars)
Source: Penn World Tables (9.0)
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Figure 1.8: Sigma Convergence for GDP per capita (PPP) from 1960 to 2013
Source: See data Appendix
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Figure 1.9: Caribbean countries: Life Expectancy at birth (years)
Country ISO Code: TTO is for Trinidad and Tobago; VCT is for St. Vincent and the Grenadines;VGB is for The
British Virgin Islands; VIG is for The US Virgin Islands; LCA is for St. Lucia; MSR is for Montserrat; MTQ is for
Martinique; PRI is for Puerto Rico; TCA is for Turks and Caicos Islands; GLP is for Guadeloupe; GRD is for
Grenada; HTI is for Haiti; JAM is for Jamaica; KNA is for St. Kitts and Nevis; BRB is for Barbados; CUB is for
Cuba; CYM is for The Cayman Islands; DMA is for Dominica; DOM is for Dominican Republic; ABW is for Aruba;
AIA is for Anguilla; ANT is for Netherlands Antilles; ATG is for Antigua and Barbuda; BHS is for Bahamas.
Source: See data Appendix
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Figure 1.10: Caribbean countries: Infant Mortality Rate under 1 age (per 1,000 live births)
Country ISO Code: TTO is for Trinidad and Tobago; VCT is for St. Vincent and the Grenadines;VGB is for The
British Virgin Islands; VIG is for The US Virgin Islands; LCA is for St. Lucia; MSR is for Montserrat; MTQ is for
Martinique; PRI is for Puerto Rico; TCA is for Turks and Caicos Islands; GLP is for Guadeloupe; GRD is for
Grenada; HTI is for Haiti; JAM is for Jamaica; KNA is for St. Kitts and Nevis; BRB is for Barbados; CUB is for
Cuba; CYM is for The Cayman Islands; DMA is for Dominica; DOM is for Dominican Republic; ABW is for Aruba;
AIA is for Anguilla; ANT is for Netherlands Antilles; ATG is for Antigua and Barbuda; BHS is for Bahamas.
Source: See data Appendix
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Figure 1.11: Average Growth Rate of GDP per capita (PPP) in Sub-Periods
Country ISO Code: TTO is for Trinidad and Tobago; VCT is for St. Vincent and the Grenadines;VGB is for The
British Virgin Islands; VIG is for The US Virgin Islands; LCA is for St. Lucia; MSR is for Montserrat; MTQ is for
Martinique; PRI is for Puerto Rico; TCA is for Turks and Caicos Islands; GLP is for Guadeloupe; GRD is for
Grenada; HTI is for Haiti; JAM is for Jamaica; KNA is for St. Kitts and Nevis; BRB is for Barbados; CUB is for
Cuba; CYM is for The Cayman Islands; DMA is for Dominica; DOM is for Dominican Republic; ABW is for Aruba;
AIA is for Anguilla; ANT is for Netherlands Antilles; ATG is for Antigua and Barbuda; BHS is for Bahamas.
Source: See data Appendix
34
F
ig
u
re
1
.1
2
:
C
a
ri
b
b
ea
n
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s:
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
S
ta
tu
s
in
H
is
to
ry
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
’
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
C
o
u
n
tr
y
IS
O
C
o
d
e:
T
T
O
is
fo
r
T
ri
n
id
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
;
V
C
T
is
fo
r
S
t.
V
in
ce
n
t
a
n
d
th
e
G
re
n
a
d
in
es
;V
G
B
is
fo
r
T
h
e
B
ri
ti
sh
V
ir
g
in
Is
la
n
d
s;
V
IG
is
fo
r
T
h
e
U
S
V
ir
g
in
Is
la
n
d
s;
L
C
A
is
fo
r
S
t.
L
u
ci
a
;
M
S
R
is
fo
r
M
o
n
ts
er
ra
t;
M
T
Q
is
fo
r
M
a
rt
in
iq
u
e;
P
R
I
is
fo
r
P
u
er
to
R
ic
o
;
T
C
A
is
fo
r
T
u
rk
s
a
n
d
C
a
ic
o
s
Is
la
n
d
s;
G
L
P
is
fo
r
G
u
a
d
el
o
u
p
e;
G
R
D
is
fo
r
G
re
n
a
d
a
;
H
T
I
is
fo
r
H
a
it
i;
J
A
M
is
fo
r
J
a
m
a
ic
a
;
K
N
A
is
fo
r
S
t.
K
it
ts
a
n
d
N
ev
is
;
B
R
B
is
fo
r
B
a
rb
a
d
o
s;
C
U
B
is
fo
r
C
u
b
a
;
C
Y
M
is
fo
r
T
h
e
C
a
y
m
a
n
Is
la
n
d
s;
D
M
A
is
fo
r
D
o
m
in
ic
a
;
D
O
M
is
fo
r
D
o
m
in
ic
a
n
R
ep
u
b
li
c;
A
B
W
is
fo
r
A
ru
b
a
;
A
IA
is
fo
r
A
n
g
u
il
la
;
A
N
T
is
fo
r
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
A
n
ti
ll
es
;
A
T
G
is
fo
r
A
n
ti
g
u
a
a
n
d
B
a
rb
u
d
a
;
B
H
S
is
fo
r
B
a
h
a
m
a
s.
35
T
a
b
le
1
.1
:
L
is
t
o
f
C
a
ri
b
b
ea
n
S
ta
te
s
in
o
u
r
D
a
ta
se
t
C
ou
n
tr
y
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
L
a
n
d
S
iz
e
F
ir
st
C
o
lo
n
y
o
f
L
a
st
C
o
lo
n
y
o
f
Y
ea
r
w
h
en
C
o
lo
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
S
ta
rt
ed
Y
ea
r
w
h
en
In
te
rn
a
l
S
el
f-
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
S
ta
rt
ed
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
in
A
n
gu
il
la
(A
IA
)
1
4
,4
6
0
3
5
U
K
U
K
1
6
5
0
1
9
7
1
−
A
n
ti
gu
a
an
d
B
ar
b
u
d
a
(A
T
G
)
9
0
,9
0
3
1
7
1
U
K
U
K
1
6
3
2
1
9
6
7
1
9
8
1
M
on
ts
er
ra
t
(M
S
R
)
5
,0
9
4
3
9
U
K
U
K
1
6
3
2
1
9
6
0
−
G
u
ad
el
ou
p
e
(G
P
)
4
0
3
,7
5
0
6
5
9
F
ra
n
ce
F
ra
n
ce
1
6
3
5
1
9
4
6
−
D
om
in
ic
a
(D
M
A
)
7
2,
3
4
1
2
9
0
F
ra
n
ce
U
K
1
6
3
2
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
8
M
ar
ti
n
iq
u
e
(M
T
Q
)
3
9
6
,1
7
6
4
0
9
F
ra
n
ce
F
ra
n
ce
1
6
3
5
1
9
4
6
−
S
t
L
u
ci
a
(L
C
A
)
1
8
3,
5
9
8
2
3
4
F
ra
n
ce
U
K
1
6
5
0
1
9
6
0
1
9
7
9
S
t
V
in
ce
n
t
an
d
th
e
G
re
n
ad
in
es
(V
C
T
)
1
0
9
,3
7
1
1
5
0
F
ra
n
ce
U
K
1
7
1
9
1
9
6
0
1
9
7
9
B
ar
b
ad
os
(B
R
B
)
2
8
6,
0
6
6
1
6
6
U
K
U
K
1
6
2
7
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
6
G
re
n
ad
a
(G
R
D
)
1
0
6
,3
0
3
1
3
3
F
ra
n
ce
U
K
1
6
5
0
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
4
T
ri
n
id
ad
an
d
T
ob
ag
o
(T
T
O
)
1
,3
4
4
,2
3
5
1,
9
8
0
S
p
a
in
U
K
1
5
9
2
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
2
S
ai
n
t
K
it
ts
an
d
N
ev
is
(K
N
A
)
5
4,
7
8
9
1
0
0
U
K
U
K
1
6
2
3
1
9
6
7
1
9
8
3
B
ri
ti
sh
V
ir
gi
n
Is
la
n
d
s
(V
G
B
)
2
6,
7
3
3
5
8
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
U
K
1
6
4
8
1
9
6
7
−
U
S
V
ir
gi
n
Is
la
n
d
s
(V
IR
)
1
0
4
,1
7
0
1
3
4
F
ra
n
ce
U
S
1
6
2
5
1
9
7
6
−
P
u
er
to
R
ic
o
(P
R
I)
3,
5
4
8
,3
9
7
3,
4
2
5
S
p
a
in
U
S
1
5
0
8
1
9
5
2
−
D
om
in
ic
an
R
ep
u
b
li
c
(D
O
M
)
1,
0
5
2
8,
9
5
4
1
8,
6
5
7
S
p
a
in
S
p
a
in
1
4
9
6
1
8
4
4
1
8
6
5
H
ai
ti
(H
T
I)
1
0
,4
6
1
,4
0
9
1
0,
6
4
1
S
p
a
in
F
ra
n
ce
1
4
9
3
1
8
0
4
1
8
0
4
T
u
rk
s
an
d
C
ai
co
s
Is
la
n
d
s
(T
C
A
)
3
3
,7
3
6
3
6
6
U
K
U
K
1
6
7
8
1
9
6
2
−
B
ah
am
as
(B
H
S
)
3
8
2,
5
7
1
3,
8
6
5
U
K
U
K
1
6
4
8
1
9
6
4
1
9
7
3
C
u
b
a
(C
U
B
)
1
1
,2
5
8
,5
9
7
4
2,
4
0
2
S
p
a
in
S
p
a
in
1
5
1
4
1
9
0
2
1
9
0
2
C
ay
m
an
Is
la
n
d
s
(C
Y
M
)
5
9
,2
2
6
1
0
2
U
K
U
K
1
6
7
0
1
9
5
9
−
J
am
ai
ca
(J
A
M
)
2,
7
2
1
,2
5
2
4
1
8
2
S
p
a
in
U
K
1
5
0
9
1
9
5
9
1
9
6
2
A
ru
b
a
(A
B
W
)
1
0
3
,4
3
1
7
0
S
p
a
in
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
1
5
2
7
1
9
8
6
−
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
A
n
ti
ll
es
(A
N
T
)
3
0
4,
7
5
9
3
0
9
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
1
6
3
4
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
4
S
ou
rc
e:
se
e
D
at
a
A
p
p
en
d
ix
36
Table 1.2: The Comparison of GDP per capita (PPP) and Life Expectancy in 1960
Caribbean Country GDP per capita European Country GDP per capita
Bahamas, The 13, 801 Germany 13, 381
Netherlands Antilles 10, 689 Italy 10, 001
Trinidad and Tobago 8, 415 Ireland 8, 415
U.S. Virgin Islands 7, 546 Israel 7, 805
Guadeloupe 7, 102 Spain 7, 384
Martinique 6, 732 Greece 6, 263
Jamaica 5, 505 Portugal 5, 376
Caribbean Country Life Expectancy European Country Life Expectancy
Bahamas, The 62.7 Germany 69.1
Netherlands Antilles 68.0 Italy 69.1
Trinidad and Tobago 62.9 Ireland 69.7
U.S. Virgin Islands 64.0 Israel 71.7
Guadeloupe 60.5 Spain 69.1
Martinique 61.0 Greece 68.9
Jamaica 64.6 Portugal 63.4
Source: See Data Appendix
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Chapter 2
Measuring the Severity of Banking
Crises based on the Deposit data
2.1 Introduction
Banking crises are rare in the history. However, the severity of banking crises varies dramat-
ically. Insofar, most of studies measures the cost of banking crises based upon the data on output
loss. Other than the effects on real GDP, is there another potential measure to gauge the severity
of banking crises across countries?
During a banking crisis, one of the most serious and worrisome consequences is the large
withdraw of deposits from the banking system. People, in a banking panic, worry about the possible
bankruptcy of the banks they have their money deposited in. They end up with withdrawing their
money and adjusting the form of their portfolio to currency. Thus, is it possible to measure the
varying costs of banking crises in terms of the deposits loss during the banking crises? To answer
this question, we have to figure out what is banking crisis first.
2.1.1 What is banking crisis?
Each banking crisis is unique with different causes and outcomes, but how should they be
defined and categorized?
The series of surveys, introduced by Caprio and Klingebiel in 1996 and revised in 1999 and
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2003, form the basis for most recent studies of banking crises. They compile a database of 117 cases
of systematic banking crises that happened in 93 countries since the late 1970s and define crisis
as “much or all of banking capital being exhausted”[6] (Table 2.1). Bordo et al. (2001) maintain
the same definition of banking crisis, extend the scope of the survey back 90 years to 1880 and
incorporate 77 countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) use their works as basis and define banking
crises back to 1800; they implicitly use similar definitions: “non-performing loans increase sharply
and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted”[27]. Bordo et al. (2001) and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) are most famous examples of works in this vein, although it is necessarily
somewhat qualitative and subjective.
The banking crisis discussed in this study is from Laeven and Valencia (2013a), who begin
their database in 1970. A banking crisis should meet the following two conditions: “1) significant
signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the
banking system, and/or bank liquidations) and 2) significant banking policy intervention measures
in response to significant losses in the banking system”[26] 1.
2.1.2 How should the severity of a banking crisis be measured?
Costing crises is a subjective process. Extensive literature examine the costs of banking
crises. Much of debate has been concerned with the appropriate methodology to gauge costs.
Early literature mostly focuse on the fiscal costs (see, Caprio and Klingebiel (1999;2003) and
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003)), which are the costs by the government to re-capitalize banks and
reimburse insured depositors. Hoggarth et al (2002) argue that fiscal costs are not reliable measures;
the size of the payments depends on the government’s response. A laissez faire government may
let the banking system fail (such as the initial response to the US banking crisis in the 1930s),
with little cost to the government but significant costs in terms of lost output and social disruption.
Conversely, a government may over-respond to a banking crisis (as was the financial crisis in 2007)
and reduce social costs at a significantly high cost to taxpayers.
Existing researches on banking crises (IMF (1998), Bordo et al. (2001), Hoggarth et al.
(2002)) considerably focus on output lost relative to a benchmark. We identify three strains of
1They consider “policy interventions in the banking sector to be significant if at least three out of the following
six measures are used: (1) deposit freezes and/or bank holidays, (2) significant bank nationalizations, (3) bank
restructuring gross costs (at least 3 percent of GDP), (4) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and
liabilities to nonresidents), (5) significant guarantees put in place, (6) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent
of GDP)”[26].
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literature that approximate real output losses associated with banking crises. The first strand uses a
dummy variable to identify the occurrence of banking crises and estimates the cost by looking at the
coefficient of the dummy variable. The second approach proxies the losses of welfare by comparing
the actual real GDP to the potential output data. Throughout the existing literature, there are
three ways to do the comparison:
1) Output loss is summed until GDP growth rate returns to the pre-crisis growth rate
(Figure 2.1a). For example, the depth of a crisis was measured as 5%+4%+1%=10% of GDP if
the pre-crisis growth was 3% and the growth during the crisis was -2%, -1% and 2% before finally
returning to 3% growth.
2) Output loss is summed until GDP returns to its pre-crisis level, as shown in Figure 2.1b
(e.g., Cecchetti Kohler and Upper (2009))
3) Output loss is summed until GDP returns to the level of its pre-crisis trend (see Figure
2.1c). Studies such as Boyd et al (2005), Cerra and Saxena (2008), and Laeven and Valencia (2013a)
follow this path. Taking the above example, GDP in the counterfactual economy would have been
indexed to 100: 100, 103, 106, 109, 112 from the onset of the crisis, compared to an observed 100,
98, 95, 99 and 102, which result in the GDP loss of 5%+9%+10%=24% before the pre-crisis GDP
growth rate of 3% is regained. This result, for the same crisis, is much larger than the 10% derived
above.
Instead of estimating the potential GDP (trend), the third strain measures output loss by
calculating the change of real GDP from its trough after a banking crisis minus its peak (see Reinhart
and Rogoff (2019,2014) and Devereus and Dwyer (2016)) (see Figure 2.1d).
It is rather difficult to compare the results obtained from different methodologies. For
example, for the Norway banking crisis in 1990, Boyed et al. (2005) find an accumulated output
loss of at least 86% of GDP whereas Cecchetti et al. (2009) find no output impact from the crisis.
Here we gauge output costs within banking crises using the last methodology to avoid the problems
involving the trend GDP measures (see Devereus and Dwyer (2016)).
Except for output losses, many studies explore other measures that can potentially provide
insight into the severity of recessions, such as the increase of public debt (Jorda, Schularick and
Taylor (2015)); growth of bank loans relative to GDP (Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jorda,
Schularick and Taylor (2013)); the fluctuation of credit spread (Krishnamurthy and Muir (2016));
the falls in stock prices (Bordo and Haubrich (2010)), housing prices, equity prices and other asset
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prices preceding the start of the recession (see Kose and Terrones (2009) and Claessens, Kose and
Terrones (2012)).
2.1.3 Deposits in the Banking System as an Indicator?
During a banking crisis, one of the most serious and worrisome consequences is the large
withdraw of deposits from the banking system. People, in a banking panic, worry about the possible
bankruptcy of the banks and thus end up with withdrawing their money and adjusting the form
of their portfolio into currency. If the banking runs become contagious and institutionalized, the
large-scale loss in deposits could cause long term destruction of banking and even influence economic
development. Furthermore, as long as people believe other depositors are withdrawing their money,
the bank runs can be self-fulling even without an initial deterioration of the bank’s financial condition
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
Some literature have argued that bank runs can be prevented by implementing the scheme
of deposit insurance in the banking system. That is, in the case of bank failure, the insurance
institution will step in and compensate depositors for their loses. By eliminating the bank run
panics, deposit insurance works well in terms of reducing bank fragility. However, it is also inclined
to fall into the fallacy of moral hazard by creating incentives for banks to take excessive risks (Kane
(1989)). In some situations, the impact of moral hazard could be even large enough to offset the
benefits obtained from the deposit insurance. Thus, if a banking crisis occurs in countries with
deposit insurance and the decline in deposits can still be observed, this banking crisis must be a
severe one.
The severity of banking crises is quite heterogeneous. This study attempts to rank the
severity of banking crises using data on the loss of banking system liabilities (predominantly deposits)
because it is a more direct cost related to banking crises.
We have two main findings.
First, the severity of banking crises varies enormously across country and across period. It
is interesting to note that banking crises are called as such but not necessarily followed by a fall in
real output and real deposits. Our data show that not every banking crisis would lead to the loss of
deposits. This finding holds for cases with and without deposit insurance schemes.
Second, some literature have argued that bank runs can be prevented by implementing
the scheme of deposit insurance in the banking system. However, our data show that the fall in
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real deposits after a banking crisis can still be observed frequently even in the present of deposits
insurance. Our results show that, due to the impact of moral hazard, banking crises are even more
likely to happen in the countries with deposit insurance schemes. The change of real deposits in cases
with/without insurance are highly associated with the change in real GDP during crises. Therefore,
we could use the change of real deposits to measure the severity of banking crises.
2.2 Data
Laeven and Valecia (2013a) identify 147 banking crises after mid-1970s. In this analysis, we
use their crisis indices. Our deposits data are from the database of International Financial Statistics
(IFS) in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Total deposits data are summed
using demand deposits and time and saving deposits. Deposits funds within a demand deposit can
be withdrawn at any time from the depository institution, such as a checking or savings account,
ATM or online banking. Time and Saving deposit can be withdrawn upon demand and would be
paid with interests. We calculate real deposits by deflating the total deposits with a CPI index.
For this paper, we drop data for the crises where deposits data are not available2. We also
drop data for the early years of the transition economies in case of the endogenous problem. These
reduce our sample to 116 banking crises across 95 countries after 1970. Our data sample is listed in
Table 2.2.
Our real GDP data are from the Penn World Tables 9.0. We use the Penn GDP measures
that are identical to the national accounts. We use real GDP/deposits instead of real GDP/deposits
per capita to examine the real effects of banking crises since our focus is on business cycle issues.
Deposit insurance indices are from the IMF report “Deposit Insurance Database (2014)” by
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2014). Interestingly, Approximately 40% the crises reported in
Laeven and Valencia’s study occurred in countries with deposit insurance schemes, which raises our
questions about the effectiveness of such schemes in quelling depositor runs.
2Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principle, etc
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2.3 Measuring the Cost of a Banking Crisis based on the
Deposit Loss
To set the stage, we have to examine the real effects of banking crises on the output and
deposits and determine whether the two effects are highly associated. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the
distributions of the growth rates of real GDP and real deposits for 116 banking crises from five years
before to five years after a banking crisis using a “violin” graph. In this graph we provide the density
and the mean value for each year.
Figure 2.2 reveals that a banking crisis is not necessarily associated with a contraction in
output (recession). According to our data, only 60% of the crises have a contraction in real GDP
following the year of banking crisis. Devereus and Dwyer (2013; 2016) find similar results for 161
countries around the world from 1970 to 2011.
A recession is not an inevitable consequence of a banking crisis but a fall in real deposits is
typical. Figure 2.3 shows that mean growth rate of real deposits falls after a banking crisis. About
70% of banking crises are followed by a contraction in real deposits after a banking crisis.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the trends of real GDP and real deposits for two example countries
(Greece and the Philippines) from 1970 to 2010. The episodes of banking crises are indicated by the
shaded area. The fluctuations of the two variables are similar, and the recession following a banking
crisis is accompanied by a fall in real deposits in both countries. How about the other countries?
Recession is definitely a severe crisis, and a severe banking crisis usually goes with the
contraction of deposits in the absence of a deposit insurance scheme. On the contrary, if a decline
in real deposits is observed, what is the probability for this banking crisis to become a recession? In
order to figure this out, we list the fraction of contraction in real GDP and real deposits following
banking crises in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 lists the following.
Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=61.20%
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)=68.97%
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)=48.28%
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We can then calculate the conditional probability of recession as follows.
Pr(Recession
∣∣∣ Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
48.28%
68.97%
≈ 70%
> Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=61.20%
The conditional probability of recession (given the fall in deposits during a banking crisis)
is larger than the probability of recession itself. That is, if real deposits fall in a banking crisis, the
crisis is highly likely to become a recession. Thus, we can use deposits loss to measure the severity
of banking crisis. The higher the real deposits fall during a crisis, the more severe this crisis could
be.
Table 2.3 considers the entire sample, whereas Table 2.4 to 2.5 break down the fractions for
cases without/with deposit insurance schemes. Table 2.4 shows that 69 banking crises (out of 116)
occurred in the absence of deposit insurance, with an average duration of the fall in real GDP and
real Deposits of 1.29 and 1.33 years, respectively. We repeat the process and compare the conditional
probability of recession with the original probability of recession in both cases. Table 2.4 shows the
following variables for countries without deposit insurance (Table 2.4):
Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=50.72%
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)=69.57%
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)=43.47%
The conditional probability of recession is:
Pr(Recession
∣∣∣ Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
43.47%
69.57%
= 62.48%
> Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=50.72%
The conditional probability of recession in the cases without deposit insurance schemes is
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greater than the probability of recession.
Then we confine our attention to the 47 cases where deposit insurances are in place, it is
strikingly to notice that approximately half of the cases still experience decrease in real deposits.
The policy of deposit insurance may have increased moral hazard and encouraged excessive bank
risk taking. We repeat the above process to further confirm this hypothesis.
For countries with deposit insurance (Table 2.5):
Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=76.60%
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)=46.37%
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)=37.68%
The conditional probability of recession:
Pr(Recession
∣∣∣ Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
Pr(Decline in both real GDP and real Deposits following a banking crisis)
Pr(Decline in Real Deposits following a banking crisis)
=
37.68%
46.37%
= 81.26%
> Pr(Recession following a banking crisis)=76.60%
We obtain two findings from these data. First, moral hazard increases substantially for
countries with deposit insurance because the probability of recessions is higher in such countries.
Second, the conditional probability of recession is higher than the probability of recession in both
cases regardless of the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. This finding further confirms our
hypothesis that the change of real deposits could be used to measure the varying loss of banking
crises regardless of the presence of deposit insurance.
2.4 Cross Section Regression
Descriptive statistics related to variables are presented in Table 2.6. Table 2.7 presents the
cross-section regressions of real deposits growth over two years after a crisis on the change of real
GDP.
The first column of the table considers the entire sample. The second and third columns
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break the sample into two cases, without and with deposit insurance schemes.
All regressions have a relatively high goodness-of-fit R2. Real deposits change in all measures
has a statistically explanatory power for output change after a banking crisis. For episodes with
deposit insurance schemes, a 1% decline in real deposits could translate to 0.1% drop in real GDP,
on average (Table 2.7).
If we only focus on the banking crises with an output fall, we find the same results still
exist in the relationship between output loss and deposits loss, as presented in Figure 2.6 to 2.7. In
those figures, We measure the decline in real GDP (real deposits) in the same way with Devereus
and Dwyer (2016), i.e. “by the change in the logarithm of real GDP (real deposit) from its trough
as much as five years after a banking crisis minus its prior peak either one year before a banking
crisis or the year of a banking crisis”[13]. We drop the cases where output and deposits do not fall
in the banking crises. The solid lines in the graph are regression lines for regressions of the output
loss on the deposit loss. The dashed lines are regression lines with no intercept. Real deposits loss
during banking crises is highly associated with real GDP loss. Thus, we can develop a severity index
of banking crisis based on the data on real deposits.
2.5 Develop an Index
GDP can be considered the most comprehensive measure of economic activity, which covers
the concerns of the depth and diffusion of banking crises. However, we can use other metrics that
are highly correlated with GDP fluctuations. In this analysis, we consider the change of real deposits
during a banking crisis from peak to trough to measure the severity of the crises.
Our index is calculated as follows,
Indexi =
Change of Real Deposits from Peak to Trough during a Banking Crisisi
Real Deposits at the Year of Peaki
(2.1)
where crises are defined using Laeven and Valencia (2013a) chronology.
We measure the real deposits cost after a banking crisis in the same way we did on real
GDP. That is, we calculate the change in the level of real deposits from its peak to its trough. This
measure can be generalizable to countries that have banking crises and show a subsequent decline
in real deposits. Data also show that many countries have banking crises but no decline in deposits.
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Thus, we assign an index of zero for such cases.
We index the severity indicator of 1988 US banking crisis to 100 and chain the other crises
to the benchmark. The results of severity indices are presented in Table 2.8 3.
We compare the severity of banking crises across countries and across time following the
calculation of our index.
Figure 2.8 shows the distributions of severity indices of banking crises using Boxplot graphs,
where we provide the median and the upper and lower quartiles for each category. The first panel of
Figure 2.8 considers the differences in severity across countries with different income levels. Middle-
and low-income economies received the most severe banking crises in history compared with high-
income economies; this result is consistent with the finding of Devereus and Dwyer (2016) who use
GDP to measure the severity of crises.
The second panel of Figure 2.8 compares the severity of banking crises across time. We do
not find significant differences among them except for the 1970s. Therefore, the banking crises are
not becoming increasingly severe, which is consistent with the findings of Bordo et al. (2000).
The last panel of Figure 2.8 compares the severity of banking crises with/without deposit
insurance schemes. Banking crises are less severe in countries with deposit insurance.
This severity index is not 100% accurate, especially for cases with deposit insurance. How-
ever, real deposits provide another potential metric to measure the size of loss during banking crises.
2.6 Conclusions
The banking crisis problem is one of the dominant macroeconomic features of our age and
debate still exists as to the magnitude of the severity of crises. The previous literature measure the
size of losses in the banking crises from various perspectives such as fiscal costs, debt growth, output
costs and so on. In this analysis, we have considered the real deposits losses within the banking
system during banking crises across country after 1970s.
Our estimates of deposits costs have several implications.
First, the severity of banking crises varies enormously across country and across period.
Banking crises are called as such but not necessarily followed by a fall in real output and real
3We drop 10 crises with deposit insurance scheme where real deposits do not fall. For such cases, deposit insurance
scheme had succeeded to prevent bank runs and therefore, it is hard to measure the size of crises based on deposits
data . Those crises are Argentina (1995), Bangladesh (1987), Belguim (2008), Bolivia (1986, 1994), Cabo Verde
(1993), Chile (1976), India (1993), Norway (1991), US (2008) and Yemen (1986).
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deposits. Our data show that not every banking crisis would lead to the loss of deposits. This
finding holds for cases with and without deposit insurance schemes.
Second, some literature have argued that bank runs can be prevented by implementing
the scheme of deposit insurance in the banking system. However, our data show that the fall in
real deposits after a banking crisis can still be observed frequently even in the present of deposits
insurance. Our results show that, due to the impact of moral hazard, banking crises are even more
likely to happen in the countries with deposit insurance schemes. The change of real deposits in cases
with/without insurance are highly associated with the change in real GDP during crises. Therefore,
we could use the change of real deposits to measure the severity of banking crises. No matter for
the cases with/without insurance, the change of real deposits are highly associated with the change
of real GDP during the crises. As a result, we could use the change of real deposits to measure the
severity of banking crises.
A fraction of this paper was devoted to developing an index to rank banking crises by
degree of recession severity. We find 1) middle and low income economies seem have received the
most severe banking crises since 1970s; 2) the banking crises are not getting worse across time; 3)
crises with deposit insurance schemes are slightly less severe than that without deposit insurance.
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Figure 2.6: Comparing Output Costs with Deposit Costs of Banking Crises
This figure compares output costs with deposit costs. We only consider those crises (n=56) where both output and
deposit fall. The solid line in the graph is regression line for regression of the output loss on the deposit loss. The
dashed line is regression line with no intercept.
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Table 2.2: List of Banking Crises in the Data Sample
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Deposit
Insurance
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Deposit
Insurance
Algeria 1990 0 Congo, Rep 1992 0
Argentina 1980 1 Costa Rica 1987 0
Argentina 1989 1 Costa Rica 1994 0
Argentina 1995 1 Cote d’Ivoire 1988 0
Argentina 2001 1 Croatia 1998 0
Austria 2008 1 Czech Republic 1996 1
Bangladesh 1987 0 Denmark 2008 1
Belguim 2008 1 Djibouti 1991 0
Benin 1988 0 Dominican Rep 2003 0
Bolivia 1986 0 Ecuador 1982 0
Bolivia 1994 0 Ecuador 1998 1
Brazil 1990 0 Egypt 1980 0
Brazil 1994 0 El Salvador 1989 0
Bulgaria 1996 1 Finland 1991 1
Burkina Faso 1990 0 France 2008 1
Burundi 1994 0 Germany 2008 1
Cabo Verde 1993 0 Ghana 1982 0
Cameroon 1987 0 Greece 2008 1
Cameroon 1995 0 Guinea 1993 0
Central African Rep 1995 0 Guinea-Bissau 1995 0
Chad 1983 0 Haiti 1994 0
Chad 1982 0 Hungary 2008 1
Chile 1976 0 Iceland 2008 1
Chile 1981 0 India 1993 1
Colombia 1982 0 Indonesia 1997 0
Colombia 1998 1 Ireland 2008 1
Congo, Dem Rep 1983 0 Israel 1977 0
Congo, Dem Rep 1991 0 Italy 2008 1
Congo, Dem Rep 1994 0 Jamaica 1996 0
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(continued)
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Deposit
Insurance
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Deposit
Insurance
Japan 1997 1 Peru 1983 0
Jordan 1989 0 Philippines 1983 1
Kazakhstan 2008 1 Philippines 1997 1
Kenya 1985 0 Portugal 2008 1
Kenya 1992 1 Russia 1998 0
South Korea 1997 1 Senegal 1988 0
Kuwait 1982 0 Sierra Leone 1990 0
Latvia 2008 1 Slovak Rep 1998 1
Lebanon 1990 1 Spain 1977 1
Luxembourg 2008 1 Sri Lanka 1989 1
Macedonia 1993 0 Swaziland 1995 0
Madagascar 1988 0 Sweden 2008 1
Malaysia 1997 0 Switzerland 2008 1
Mali 1987 0 Tanzania 1987 0
Mauritania 1984 0 Thailand 1983 0
Mexico 1981 0 Thailand 1997 1
Mexico 1994 1 Togo 1993 0
Mongolia 2008 0 Tunisia 1991 0
Morocco 1980 0 Turkey 1982 0
Mozambique 1987 0 Turkey 2000 1
Nepal 1988 0 Uganda 1994 1
Netherlands 2008 1 Ukraine 1998 1
Nicaragua 1990 0 Uruguay 1981 0
Nicaragua 2000 0 Uruguay 2002 1
Niger 1983 0 United States 1988 1
Nigeria 1991 1 United States 2008 1
Norway 1991 1 Venezuela 1994 1
Panama 1988 0 Yemen 1996 0
Paraguay 1995 0 Zambia 1995 0
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF; World Bank; Fed Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Table 2.3: Output and Deposit Decline Associated with Banking Crises (For all countries)
Panel A: Real Output Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where real Output
falls
Crises where real
Output does not fall
Number n = 116 n = 71 n = 45
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 61.20% 38.80%
Average Duration of the
fall in real GDP (Year)
1.42 2.33 0.00
Panel B: Real Deposit Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where Real
Deposit fall
Crises where Real
Deposit do not fall
Number n = 116 n = 80 n = 35
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 68.97% 31.03%
Average Duration of the
fall in real Deposits
(Year)
1.56 2.24 0.00
Panel C: Real Output and Deposit Decline
Crises where both Real
Deposit and Real
Output fall
Crises where Real
Deposit falls and Real
Output does not fall
Crises where Real
Deposit does not fall
and Real Output fall
Number n = 56 n = 24 n = 14
Fraction (Percentage) 48.28% 20.69% 12.07%
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Table 2.4: Output and Deposit Decline Associated with Banking Crises (For Crises Without Deposit
Insurance)
Panel A: Real Output Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where real
Output falls
Crises where real
output does not fall
Number n = 69 n = 35 n = 34
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 50.72% 49.28%
Average Duration of the
fall in real GDP (Year)
1.29 2.54 0.00
Panel B: Real Deposit Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where real
Deposit falls
Crises where real
Deposit does not
fall
Number n = 69 n = 48 n = 21
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 69.57% 30.43%
Average Duration of the
fall in real Deposits
(Year)
1.33 1.92 0.00
Panel C: Real Output and Real Deposit Decline
Crises where both
Real Deposits and
Real Output fall
Crises where Real
Deposit falls and
Real Output does
not fall
Crises where Real
Deposit does not
fall and Real
Output falls
Number n = 30 n = 18 n = 15
Fraction (Percentage) 43.47% 26.09% 21.74%
71
Table 2.5: Output and Deposit Decline Associated with Banking Crises (For Crises with Deposit
Insurance)
Panel A: Real Output Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where real
Output falls
Crises where real
output does not fall
Number n = 47 n = 36 n = 11
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 76.60% 23.40%
Average Duration of the
fall in real GDP (Year)
1.62 2.11 0.00
Panel B: Real Deposit Decline
All Banking Crises Crises where real
Deposit falls
Crises where real
Deposit does not
fall
Number n = 69 n = 32 n = 37
Fraction (Percentage) 100% 46.37% 53.62%
Average Duration of the
fall in real Deposits
(Year)
1.85 2.72 0.00
Panel C: Real Output and Real Deposit Decline
Crises where both
Real Deposits and
Real Output fall
Crises where Real
Deposit falls and
Real Output does
not fall
Crises where Real
Deposit does not
fall and Real
Output falls
Number n = 26 n = 6 n = 10
Fraction (Percentage) 37.68% 8.70% 14.49%
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics
Mean Std
Deviation
Min Max
Dependent Variable
Growth of real GDP over 2 years after crisis 0.03 0.09 −0.23 0.44
Change of real GDP from Peak to Trough −0.07 0.07 −0.32 −0.05
Time Duration of real GDP from Peak to
Trough (Year)
2.32 1.48 1.00 6.00
Time Duration of real GDP from Trough to
Recovery (Year)
2.91 3.02 1.00 16.00
Explanatory Variable
Growth of real Deposits over 2 years after
crisis
0.04 0.34 −0.85 1.44
Change of real Deposits from Peak to
Trough
−0.20 0.26 −0.99 0.00
Deposit Insurance (dummy) 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Annual Growth over 5 years of real GDP 0.03 0.04 −0.13 0.10
Credit Boom (dummy) 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
High Income (dummy) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Middle Income (dummy) 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Low Income (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Transition Economies (dummy) 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
We measure the change of real GDP (real deposit) by the change in the logarithm of real GDP
(real deposit) from its trough as much as five years after a banking crisis minus its prior peak
whether one year before a banking crisis or the year of a banking crisis. We drop data if real
output (real deposit) does not fall.
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Table 2.7: Regression Results
Variable (1)
All Sample
(2)
Cases without
Deposit
Insurance
(3)
Cases with
Deposit
Insurance
Real Deposits Growth two years
after a Banking Crisis
0.08*** 0.07** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Annual Growth rate over 5 years
of real GDP before a Crisis
−0.60**
(0.22)
−0.39
(0.33)
−0.86**
(0.29)
Credit Boom (dummy) −0.03* −0.02 −0.04
(0.02) (2.29) (0.02)
High Income (dummy) 0.03* 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Middle Income (dummy) 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Low Income (dummy) 0.05** 0.04* 0.19*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Observations (N) 116 69 47
Adjusted R2 29.42% 23.89% 39.72%
Dependent Variable is the growth of real GDP from the year of the banking crisis to two years
later. The dummy variable for “Transition Countries” is deleted.
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Table 2.8: Severity Index of Banking Crises
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Severity
Index
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Severity
Index
Algeria 1990 244 Croatia 1998 35
Argentina 1980 237 Czech Republic 1996 62
Argentina 1989 386 Denmark 2008 143
Argentina 2001 199 Djibouti 1991 417
Austria 2008 11 Dominican Rep 2003 161
Benin 1988 32 Ecuador 1982 498
Brazil 1990 431 Ecuador 1998 513
Brazil 1994 286 Egypt 1980 0
Bulgaria 1996 409 El Salvador 1989 192
Burkina Faso 1990 13 Finland 1991 16
Burundi 1994 286 France 2008 0
Cameroon 1987 235 Germany 2008 0
Cameroon 1995 133 Ghana 1982 254
Central African Rep 1995 194 Greece 2008 182
Chad 1983 0 Guinea 1993 4
Chad 1982 253 Guinea-Bissau 1995 66
Chile 1981 103 Haiti 1994 148
Colombia 1982 0 Hungary 2008 42
Colombia 1998 287 Iceland 2008 121
Congo, Dem Rep 1983 129 Indonesia 1997 31
Congo, Dem Rep 1991 443 Ireland 2008 69
Congo, Dem Rep 1994 462 Israel 1977 249
Congo, Rep 1992 335 Italy 2008 17
Costa Rica 1987 0 Jamaica 1996 75
Costa Rica 1994 318 Japan 1997 70
Cote d’Ivoire 1988 138 Jordan 1989 122
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(continued)
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Severity
Index
Country Year of
Banking
Crisis
Severity
Index
Kazakhstan 2008 0 Philippines 1983 184
Kenya 1985 0 Philippines 1997 0
Kenya 1992 77 Portugal 2008 85
South Korea 1997 0 Russia 1998 71
Kuwait 1982 0 Senegal 1988 0
Latvia 2008 97 Sierra Leone 1990 325
Lebanon 1990 75 Slovak Rep 1998 4
Luxembourg 2008 152 Spain 1977 33
Macedonia 1993 462 Sri Lanka 1989 10
Madagascar 1988 0 Swaziland 1995 1
Malaysia 1997 7 Sweden 2008 0
Mali 1987 0 Switzerland 2008 0
Mauritania 1984 23 Tanzania 1987 0
Mexico 1981 199 Thailand 1983 0
Mexico 1994 33 Thailand 1997 0
Mongolia 2008 160 Togo 1993 216
Morocco 1980 0 Tunisia 1991 7
Mozambique 1987 574 Turkey 1982 13
Nepal 1988 0 Turkey 2000 66
Netherlands 2008 10 Uganda 1994 0
Nicaragua 1990 1 Ukraine 1998 0
Nicaragua 2000 0 Uruguay 1981 13
Niger 1983 0 Uruguay 2002 137
Nigeria 1991 528 United States 1988 100
Panama 1988 170 Venezuela 1994 225
Paraguay 1995 58 Zambia 1995 24
Peru 1983 129
We drop 10 crises with deposit insurance scheme where real deposits do not fall. For such cases,
deposit insurance scheme had succeeded to prevent bank runs and therefore, it is hard to measure
the size of crises based on deposits data . Those crises are Argentina (1995), Bangladesh (1987),
Belguim (2008), Bolivia (1986, 1994), Cabo Verde (1993), Chile (1976), India (1993), Norway
(1991), US (2008) and Yemen (1986).
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Chapter 3
Oil Price Shocks and Output
Growth – A VAR approach
3.1 Introduction
Oil price shocks have become a major contributor to business cycle fluctuations in the
past 50 years throughout the world. A large number of research have attempted to quantify the
relationship between oil prices and output. Of course, oil price rise/fall should have different effects
between oil importers and oil exporters. Generally we say a rise in oil price would bring revenue for
oil exporting countries, while reduce revenue for oil exporting countries.
The early literature assume a linear relationship between oil price and output change. How-
ever, after 1980s, more attention has been transferred to non-linear specifications of oil prices. For
example, Mork (1989) specifies oil price increase and decrease as different variables to quantify their
separate effects on US economic output. He found that the response of US output is asymmetric
to the rise and fall of oil prices, pointing out that oil price decreases do not matter too much for
oil importing countries. Hamilton (1996, 1998) also finds that a non-linear specification of oil prices
can better capture the effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic activity. The same goes for
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2004).
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between output growth and oil prices change
using one linear and two major non-linear specifications. We include eight OECD countries in our
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dataset and two of them, namely the UK and Norway, are oil exporters.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
1) Based on Granger causality analysis, we reach the conclusion that the interaction between
oil price variables and macroeconomic variables is found to be insignificant under linear specification,
but generally significant under non-linear specifications. Under linear specification, a positive stan-
dard deviation innovation in oil prices has a strong positive effect on real GDP growth for almost all
oil importing countries, a finding that is against theoretical intuition. However, the results obtained
from the two non-linear approaches tell the opposite stories and confirm the inaccuracy of linear
specification.
2) Information criteria indicates that the non-linear specifications performs better than the
linear specification. As for the response size, the non-linear specifications tend to produce larger
real impacts of oil price shocks than the linear way.
3) With regard to the UK and Norway (the two net oil exporting countries in our dataset),
Norway is better off from oil price hikes while this does not hold for the UK. The contrasting result
for the UK can be attributed to a large exchange rate appreciation.
3.2 Model
In this chapter, we carry out an unrestricted Vector Autoregressive model (VAR model)
to investigate the response of output growth to innovations in oil prices. Once the VAR has been
estimated, the dynamic response of real GDP growth to innovations in oil prices can be assessed
through the Impulse Response Functions (IRF).
For each country under study, we build a VAR model, including 6 variables as endogenous
variables. All data are quarterly.
Our VAR model incorporates the following 6 variables: real GDP (gdp), real effective ex-
change rate (exr), real oil price (p), inflation (inf), and short and long-term interest rates. Real
GDP (gdp) and real oil price (p) are in expressed in logs. Real GDP is the only measure for the
economic activity, while the remaining ones are used to capture the possible transmission channels
through which oil prices may impact real GDP growth indirectly.
As for the oil price variable, we choose UK Brent (in US dollars), an internationally traded
variety of crude (UK Brent) to represent a common shock to all countries. We then deflate oil prices
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using US Producer Price Index.
Before examining the effects of oil shocks on real GDP growth, a unit root test (Augmented
Dickey-Fuller) is performed multiple times (Table 3.1). After the first difference, all variables are
stationary.
As a first step, a linear specification of oil price is estimated and then two non-linear trans-
formations are considered:
1) asymmetric specification: increases and decreases in the oil price are treated as separated
variables;
2) net specification (Hamilton, 1996): ”the relevant oil price variable is defined as the net
amount by which these prices in quarter t exceed the maximum value reached in the previous four
quarters”[6].
Under asymmetric approach, the positive growth rate of oil price oil+t , and its negative
growth rate, oil−t are defined as follows:
oil+t =

oilt, if oilt > 0
0, otherwise
(3.1)
oil−t =

oilt, if oilt < 0
0, otherwise
(3.2)
where oilt is the growth rate of real oil price.
Hamilton (1996) came up with a innovated non-linear transformation of oil prices: net oil
price increase (NOPI). This variable is defined as “the amount by which (the log of ) oil prices in
quarter t, pt, exceed the maximum value over the previous four quarters; and is 0 otherwise.” That
is:
“NOPIt = max {0, pt −max {pt−1, pt−2, pt−3, pt−4}} ” (3.3)
The sample period used is common to all countries in the sample except for the UK and
runs from 1987 : III to 2014 : IV , for a total of T = 110 quarterly observations. The UK switched
from an oil-exporting country to an oil-importing country after 2005 and thus the sample for it is
from 1987 : III to 2004 : IV . The sources of the data are described in the data appendix. The
optimal lag is chosen using AIC.
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3.3 Impacts of oil price shocks
Under this item, we analyze the empirical results for the VAR models. Except for the UK
and Norway, the other six countries under study are net oil importing countries (Figure 3.1). The
UK switched from a net oil exporter to oil importer after 2005. In order to be clear, we drop the
observations after 2005. Canada behaves as a net oil importing country over the majority of sample
period studied. We thus consider Canada as a net oil importer tentatively.
We use AIC to rank the goodness of fit of the four econometric specifications for each country
(Table 3.2).
In all cases, non-linear specifications produce a more accurate representation than the linear
one does. Except for Japan, the net specification performs better than the other transformations
considered in this study. The positive asymmetric specification works better for Japan.
3.3.1 Granger Causality Test
Under this section, we perform Granger Causality Test for each country considered, with
the null hypothesis that oil price does not Granger-cause the remaining variables of the system at
the 5% significance level (See Table 3.3). We generally cannot reject the null hypothesis under the
linear models except for France and Germany. This finding is consistent with earlier literature.
For example, Hooker (1996a) provides evidence that “For US, (linear transformations of) oil prices
creased to Granger-cause most macroeconomic indicator variables, including the unemployment rate,
real GDP, aggregate employment, and industrial production”[4].
For the asymmetric specification, while the lag of oil price increases in most countries do
not help to predict the macroeconomic variables, we find Granger-causality between the decrease
of oil prices and the macroeconomic variables. It shows that the relationship between the price of
oil and economic activity is nonlinear. However, it is also interesting to notice that our finding is
different from the earlier literature which believes that oil price decreases do not matter at all.
As for the last specification, we do observe Granger Causality between NOPIt and economic
activity in France, Germany, Italy and Norway.
In sum, there are significant interactions between oil prices and macroeconomic variables
under non-linear transformations of oil prices.
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3.3.2 Impulse Response Function
In this section, we examine the dynamic effects of oil prices innovations on GDP growth
using Orthogonalised impulse-response function for both the linear and non-linear models. Due to
the contemporaneous correlation involved in this method, we need to specify an ordering for the
six variables. We assume the following order: real GDP, real oil price, inflation, short-term interest
rate, long-term interest rate and effective exchange rate.
The orthogonalised impulse response functions shown in Figure 3.2 represent the response
of real GDP growth to one standard deviation of oil price shock for linear case. The three non-linear
cases are represented in Figure 3.3 through Figure 3.5.
The linear approach assumes a symmetric response of real GDP growth to oil price shock,
while the non-linear approaches allow for asymmetric feedback, that is, oil price increase and decrease
should impact GDP in different magnitude.
In Table 3.2 (linear specification), we observe a positive response of real GDP to an increase
in oil price in almost all countries regardless of oil importer or exporter. Generally, a rise in oil
prices should be a good news for oil exporting countries and a bad news for oil importing countries.
However, our findings are inconsistent with it under linear specification. We have to figure it out
whether it is robust to other specifications. Thus we turn to look at the results obtained for non-
linear approaches. (Figure 3.3 through 3.5)
These effects should be different between net oil importers and exporters. First we focus on
the results obtained from oil importing countries. In the case of positive movements in oil prices, a
similar shape of impulse response functions among importers can be observed. Except for Germany,
the real impact of oil price hikes is negative, which is consistent with our expectations and thus shows
that the linear approach is questionable. One possible interpretation for Germany’s exception could
be due to its unique circumstances during the period under study. Despite its large dependence on
oil, Germany started exhibiting a strong economic performance due to its political and structural
factors after the 1990s.
In the case of negative movements in oil prices, we find a pretty strong positive impact on
US real GDP growth. In other words, decreases in oil prices could provide a stimulus effect on
economic activity. Of course, this have not been without exceptions. For Canada, a tentative oil
importer, a decline in oil prices leads to a fall in output growth. This unexpected result could be due
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to the ambiguity about whether it wan an importer or exporter in the period under investigation.
Second we pay attention to the two net oil-exporting countries studied, namely the UK
and Norway. For Norway, regarding the positive movements in oil prices, the feedback of real GDP
growth starts with a positive response but only holds for two quarters. From the third quarter
onward, it is followed by a negative consequence. In the UK, the positive impact of oil price hikes
only lasts for one quarter and the following negative response of real GDP is significant as well. The
decline of oil prices do not yield a negative impact on real GDP growth in both cases of the UK and
Norway. One possible interpretation is that a decline in oil price is often associated with a sharp real
exchange rate deprecation, shrinking interest rates (short- and long-term) and inflation (see Figure
3.6). Thus, the British and Norwegian economies, as a whole, benefit from the chained effects of oil
price decline.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between output growth and oil prices change
using one linear and two major non-linear specifications. We include eight OECD countries in our
dataset and two of them, namely the UK and Norway, are oil exporters.
Following the literature, we define two non-linear specifications of oil prices, namely asym-
metric and net specifications in this chapter. By doing so, we are able to check whether oil price
increase and decrease are different in terms of their separate impacts on real economy. As a result,
we find that a decline in oil prices affects the real activity more significantly than an increase in
oil prices. One possible interpretation could be the decreasing role of oil in the economy after the
1980s.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
1) Based on Granger causality analysis, we reach the conclusion that the interaction between
oil price variables and macroeconomic variables is found to be insignificant under linear specification,
but generally significant under non-linear specifications. Under linear specification, a positive stan-
dard deviation innovation in oil prices has a strong positive effect on real GDP growth for almost all
oil importing countries, a finding that is against theoretical intuition. However, the results obtained
from the two non-linear approaches tell the opposite stories and confirm the inaccuracy of linear
specification.
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2) Information criteria indicates that the non-linear specifications performs better than the
linear specification. As for the response size, the non-linear specifications tend to produce larger
real impacts of oil price shocks than the linear way.
3) With regard to the UK and Norway (the two net oil exporting countries in our dataset),
Norway is better off from oil price hikes while this does not hold for the UK. The contrasting result
for the UK can be attributed to a large exchange rate appreciation.
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3.5 Data Appendix
The data used in this paper are from 1987 : III to 2014 : IV , for a total of T = 110 available
quarterly observations. The UK switched from an oil-exporting country to an oil-importing country
after 2005 and thus the sample for it is from 1987 : III to 2004 : IV . The corresponding sources are
as follows:
Real GDP: Penn World Tables 9.0.
Nominal Oil Price: Fed Reserve, UK Brent Price.
US producer Price Index: IFS.
Real Oil Price: Nominal Oil price deflated by US Producer Price Index.
Real Effective Exchange Rate: World Bank.
Short-term Interest rates: IFS.
Long-term Interest rates: IFS.
Consumer Price Index: World Bank.
84
Bibliography
[1] Amano, R.A. and Van Norden, S., 1998. Oil prices and the rise and fall of the US real exchange
rate. Journal of international Money and finance, 17(2), pp.299-316.
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Table 3.2: Relative Performance of the Models
Linear Asymmetric Net Oil Price
pt o
+
t o
−
t NOPIt
Country
US AIC −1144.195 −1213.966 −1234.82 −1265.051
Japan AIC −778.052 −898.821 −829.209 −865.762
France AIC −1367.404 −1456.612 −1459.439 −1495.376
Germany AIC −1077.092 −1181.482 −1161.152 −1218.767
Italy AIC −1055.381 −1156.393 −1149.042 −1215.461
Canada AIC −1050.975 −1144.421 −1124.491 −1163.731
Norway AIC −634.948 −727.161 −691.735 −745.897
UK AIC −1044.376 −1152.965 −1183.462 −1235.542
Note: p is the oil price, o+ is the increase of oil price, o- is the decrease of
oil price, NOPI is the net oil price
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Table 3.3: Granger Causality (p-value is reported)
Linear Asymmetric Net Oil Price
pt o
+
t o
−
t NOPIt
Country
US 0.1915 0.3438 0.0775* 0.3544
Japan 0.6942 0.2205 0.1658 0.2576
France 0.0002*** 0.0097*** 0.0781* 0.0896*
Germany 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0780* 0.0258**
Italy 0.2600 0.4083 0.0985* 0.0776*
Canada 0.7295 0.6469 0.0008** 0.9089
Norway 0.0173 0.1629 0.0705* 0.0899*
UK 0.0922* 0.1525 0.0027*** 0.1756
Null Hypothesis: oil price variable does not Granger cause the
remaining variables of the system.
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